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ABSTRACT
This paper argues that Japan's export growth is likely to slow
sharply over the next few years, perhaps to zero. For the past dozen
years Japan's export volume has gown much more rapidly than her domestic
production. This divergence was made necessary primarily by rising oil
prices, and secondarily by a shift into current account surplus. Now
both these factors are running in reverse. If Japan's export growth does
slow sharply, the mechanism will be a very strong yen --probablyabove
140. The paper argues that it is Japan's export growth rather than
static trade structure that is the main cause o± trade tension, so these
developments should lead to a considerable reduction in trade friction.
Mr. Paul Krugman
Sloan School of Management
MIT
E52-383A
Cambridge, MA 02139For most of theUSpublic, trade relations xith Japan are the
dominant issue of international economic policy. International debt is
the problem of the bankers, and may even serve them right; agricultural
trade and the EEC is a farmers' problem; but the Japanese issue touches
not only our sense of national pride but our jobs. The futuregrowth of
world trade depends more on how the US comes to perceive its trade with
Japan than on any other issue.
What I will argue in this paper is that there is avery good chance
that we are about to see a dramatic change in the fundamentalbackground
to US—Japanese trade relations. I will argue that the main source of
friction does not lie in such deep issues as the differences between US
and Japanese institutions and social structures. It lies instead in the
huge manufacturing trade surplus and rapid export growth that Japan
experienced from 1973 to the present. These proximate sources of trade
friction in turn had their origin primarily in the more fundamental
factors of oil price increases and a shift of Japan into current account
surplus, with oil, not the current account shift, the more important of
the two.
In little more than a year, both of these factors haveexperienced
dramatic reversals. It has been widely recognized that the fall in the
dollar will lead to an improved US trade picture. It is also thecase
that falling oil prices tend, by strengthening theyen, to reduce Japan's
surplus in manufactures ——apoint well understood by economists, if less
appreciated among businessmen and politicians. What has been lacking sofar, however, is a quantitative assessment of how much difference the
recent changes can make. What we will see is that a simple numerical
analysis suggests that recent changes will in fact have massive effects
on the situation. Quite suddenly it has become plausible to suppose that
over the next five years we will see the growth of Japanese exports slow
to less than one percent per year. This suggests that if the current
protectionist pressures in the US do not lead to a trade war with Japan,
an era of relative trade peace may lie just ahead.
THE SOURCES OF GROWING TRADE FRICTION, 1973—84
In the early 1970s a reasonable forecast for the future of US—Japan
trade relations might have been quite optimistic. The realignment of the
dollar—yen rate 4rom 1970—3 was visibly reducing the large Japanese trade
surpluses that had emerged at the end of the Bretton Woods system. As far
as most observers could judge, Japan's economy was experiencing
considerable liberalization, as the government's control over both
4oreiqn transactions and domestic credit markets was loosened. There was
every reason to expect Japan's role in the international economic system
to become normalized, similar to that of other denselypopulated
industrial countries such as Germans
Instead trade relations between the US and Japan have grown:
increasingly strained. Many in the US argue that this is because the
apparent liberalization ofJapan'seconomy was never real; thatJapanesegovernment and business practces continued to di4fer from those of the
USin a way that worked to the US disadvantage. Defenders of Japanargue
instead that these accusations are being used to rationalize anti—
Japanese sentiment that has little to do with the alleged unfair
practices. The true sources oftradefriction, it may be argued, lie
instead in two facts that have little to do with Japans tradepolicy.
The first fact is that during the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s
the world economic environment changed in such away that Japan developed
a structural surplus in its trade in manufactures and its bilateral
trade with the US. The second reason, closely related to the first, is
that structural change led to a rapid pace of Japanese export growth,
arousing opposition from foreign import—competing sectors. One might also
suppose that the growth and success of Japans economy was in itself a
source of tension: as we will see, a case can be made that this was of
surprisingly little importance as compared with the rise in oil prices
and the shift of Japan into current account surplus.
The Structure of Japanese Lrade
The key facts about Japanese trade structure, and the reasonswhy US
firms inevitably feel that they lose far more often than they win in
competition with Japanese rivals, can be seen clearly by looking at a
simple graph. Figure 1 shows comparative trade structure by type of
commodity for the US, Japan, and (as a useful control) West Germany.4
FiQure 1 illustrates three basic points. First, Japan runs a huge
surplus in manufactured goods trade. The feeling of foreign firms that
they are not on a level playing field is simply the obverse of this
dominant fact. Second, most of this trade surplus in manufactures is
necessary for Japan to pay for its huge deficit in primary product trade.
Third, this trade pattern is not unique to 3apan Germany's trade
structure is, at this level of aggregation, quite similar, although the
absolute numbers are smaller.
The comparison with Germany is an important one. Economists schooled
in general equilibrium theory find it natural to assert that there is an
automatic mechanism whereby a shift toward trade deficit in one area will
lead to offsetting shifts toward surplus elsewhere. This not only
rationalizes most of Japan's manufactures trade surplus, it leads
economists to deny any link between overall trade balances and
protection. Politicians and businessmen have never been convinced by this
argument, and tend to view the application of such arguments in this case
as an apologetic for Japan. The fact that Germany, although rarely
accused of unfair trade practices, shows a similar pattern of trade
should help strengthen the economists' case. As the figure shows, in
their tendency to run manufacturing surpluses to pay for primary deficits
Germany and Japan are virtually identical twins.
In a purely accounting sense, almost three—quarters of Japans
manufactures surplus in 19B4 went to pay for a deficit in primary
products. The remaining surplus was virtually the same in Germany and
Japan, suggesting that the cause of the trade surplus was somethingcommon to both rather than special to Japan. Thenaturalexplanation, of
course, is that it was the US, with its budget deficit and resulting
overvalued dollar, that was responsible. That is, the German andJapanese
surpluses should both be viewed as caused by the US deficit.
This view should in fact be qualified somewhat. Germany's current
account surplus as a share of GNP in 1984 was only 1.0 percent,compared
with Japan's 28 percent. The difference was Germany's large deficiton
invisibles, reflecting in particular remittances by guest workers. If we
take Germany as a reference point, then we may saythatthere is in
effect a component to the Japanese manufacturing surplus that reflects
Japan's unusually large export of capital. This 'structural surplus11
component presumably reflects Japan's high savings rate, which makes
Japan a natural exporter of capital. The point remains, however, that
this "structural surplus" component is a small fraction of the total
Japanese manufacturing surplus.
We may thus imagine a hypothetical accounting for the sources of
Japan's trade surplus in manufactured goods, dividing it into three
parts: a primary products deficit component, reflecting Japan's need to
pay for imported raw materials; a "structural surplus" component,
reflecting Japan's position as a natural capital exporter; and an
"overvalued dollar" component, reflecting the temporarystrength of the
US dollar in 1984. The first of these components is definedsimply as
Japan's deficit in primary products. The division between the other two
is more difficult to ascertain. Later in thispaper it will be assumed as
a base case that the 'overvalued dollar' component of Japan's current6
account was $1 billion in 1984, or 1.25percentof GNP. This was derived
as follows. First, all of the $100 billion US current account deficit in
1984 is assumed to represent a temporary dollar overvaluation. (It could
be argued that some of this US deficit is structural however, it should
be remembered that the rise in the US deficit is ofvery recent vintage,
and was not tied to any substantial shift in either US investment or
private saving rates). Second, it is assumed that if that deficit were
eliminated, $15 billion of the shift would come from a reduction in
Japan's current account surplus, reflecting Japan's roughly 15 percent
share of the GNP of market economies outside the US. These assumptions
are rough—and—ready, but the essential point seems clear: the Japanese
structural surplus on current account is not the main source of the
surplus in manufactures.
The relationship between resources and trade also leaves its markon
Japan's pattern of regional trade. In 1984 more than half of Japan's
trade surplus with non—oil exporting countries was the counterpart ofa
deficit with oil—exporting countries. Thus Japan's heavy dependenceon
imported oil can be viewed as the prime cause of its large surplus in
trade with industrial countries, including the US.
Siven these figures, it is not surprising that Japanese trade gives
rise to friction. But there are still some puzzles. Inparticular, if
Japan and Germany look so similar, why does Japanese trade create so much
more friction? Let us consider several possible explanations.7
1. Current accounts: Germany's current accountsurplusis indeed
much smaller than Japan's. However, the di+ference is essentially
workers' remittances. It is hard to see why the fact that part of
Germany'strade surplus goes to families in Turkey or Yugoslavia should
make foreign competitors less upset about losing markets.
2. Scale: Germany is smaller than Japan, and its trade surplus,
though slightly larger relative to GNP, is only about half as large in
absolute terms. But Japan certainly experiences much more than twice as
much grief in international trade negotiations. It is hard to believe
that there is a critical mass of manufactures trade surplus somewhere
between 50 and 115 billion dollars.
3. Imports: Japan achieves its surplus with smaller imports and
exports of manufactures than Germany. Figure 2 illustrates the point. The
question is whether Japan's small manufactures imports3 aside from
providing a debating point for anti—Japanese rhetoric, actually
contribute to trade tension. Equivalently, if Japan's trade pattern
looked like 6ermanys, would tension be reduced? It is hard to believe
that it would. Indeed, it is hard to believe that it would even be
gble politically to accommodate Japan's exports if her economy were
as open as Germany's.
4. Cultural gap/racism: Germans look like us, talk a language not
too different from ours, and share a common cultural history; Japanese do
not. Thus when experts tell us that Germany is not cheating, we believe
them, while we are always ready to believe that Japanese society works in
mysterious and inscrutable ways. Unfortunately, there is almost certainlyS
acomponent of thiskindof xenophobiainthe UShostilityto Japan.It
is possible that this will turn out to be the dominant sentiment, and
that reasoned argument will eventually fail. One can onlyhope that this
is not the case.
So far our proposed explanations of the special friction withJapan
seem either of doubtful force or too depressing to accept. There is,
however, a further possible explanation that will turn out to yield
substantial grounds for hope. This is the view that the cause of
Japanese—US trade friction was not so much the current state of that
trade as the dynamics ——thatthe rapid growth of Japanese exports,
rather than their level, was the problem.
Japanese Export Growth
Figure 3 illustrates a key fact that may help explain the hostility
to Japan even more than the features of trade structurewe have
considered so far. This is the high rate of growth of Japansexports,
which is unique among industrial countries. From 1973 to 1984Japans
export volume increased by 154 percent ——twoand one half times as much
as Germany.
There are good reasons for expecting rapid growth ofexports to be
at least as serious a cause of trade friction as the currentstructure of
trade. Both a consideration of the rational interest ofpotentially
protectionist groups and what we know about politics suggest thata9
rising share of imports will create more opposition than a stable share,
however high.
Consider first the rational self—interest of workers and firms. It
is surely a reasonable approximation to regard factors of production as
sector—specific in the short run, but mobile between sectors in the long
run. What this means is that any sudden shift in the trade pattern will
impose capital losses on those factors stuck in the import—competing
industries. If the changed trade pattern is retained long enough,
however, the factors of production will exit the industry and the
political pressure for protection will abate. There will still be
potential beneficiaries from protection that would redistribute income
between broad factors of production along Stolper—Samuelson lines, but
the pressures arising from these more diffuse interest groups should be
much less severe.
The argument that new import competition creates more opposition
than old is just the other side of the frequent observation that
prolonged protection creates a vested interest in its own continuance. It
is a familiar proposition that an import quota imposed for balance of
payments reasons can give birth to a domestic industry that can prevent
the quotas removal; correspondingly, a shift in comparative advantage
that is allowed to happen long enough will lead to an exit of the firms
and workers that oppose it.
To the rational self—interest argument we may add an empirical
observation about the relationship between economics and politics. This
is that in electoral politics, at least, the success of incumbents10
depends more on whether thinqs have been gettinq better recently than on
how good they are in absolute terms. Econometric estimates ofvoting
behavior suggest that it is the recent change in the unemploymentrate,
notits level, that determines electoral outcomes. By analogy wecan
suggest that trade tension depends more on whether foreign competition is
perceived as getting more severe than on comparison with some unchanging
norm of fair trade,.
Suppose we accept that the rate of growth of Japanese exports was at
least as important as the current situation at any point in timeas a
factor in creating trade tension. Then the next question is thesource of
that rapid export growth. What we want to know is whether theexport
grDwth was an inevitable accompaniment to the rapid growth of Japans
economy, or whether it had more special and reversible causes.
To understand the sources of rapid export growth inJapan, it is
useful to develop an accounting framework that relates four variables:
export growth, import growth, the terms of trade, and the trade balance.
First, let us begin with an identity:
(1) B = — PMQM
where B = trade balance
= export price
=exportvolume
PM = import price11
=importvolume
If we totally diFferentiate (1) we get the expression
(2) dB =QdP—QMdPM+ PdQ —PMdQM
Equation (2) can be simplified if we make the assumption that
initially trade is balanced PXQ,(PMQM (since this was not strictly
true forJapanover the period, this will be a source of some slippage in
our accounting). The rewritten formula is
(3) qx —qM=(px — pM) + b
where lower—case letters signify rates of growth, and
b =dB/PQ,
i.e., the change in the trade balance as a fraction of the initial value
of exports.
What equation (3) tells us is that the discrepancy between export
and import growth rates ran be divided in an accounting sense between the
rise in import prices relative to export ——theterms of trade loss ——
andthe shift of the trade balance into surplus.12
Now let us consider the case pf Japan. Over the entire period 1973—
84 the average annual changes in the terms in equation (3) are shown in
Table 1. We note immediately that Japanese export growthwas much more
rapid than the growth of the Japanese economy as a whole ——8.5percent
versus 3.7 percent for gross domestic product. At the same time, import
growth, at 1.6 percent annually, was much less than economic growth. This
immediately tells us that Japan's rapid export growth was not
fundamentally connected to her general economic growth: if exports and
imports had both grown at the same rate as GDP, Japan's export growth
would have been less than half of what it was. We can also see that the
huge discrepancy between export and import growth rates is primarily
accounted for by the worsening of Japan's terms of trade, andonly
secondarily by the move toward trade surplus.
So far no mechanism has been introduced to make thisaccounting
identity into a causal story. If we put the observations here together
with the information on trade structure above, however, thestory seems
very clear. During the post—1973 period, Japan suffered a sharp terms of
trade worsening due to increases in oil prices. At the sametime, there
was some movement of Japan into structural current account surplus,as
investment demand fell off and savings remained high. All thiswas
reinforced by the overvalued dollar, pushing Japan further into trade
surplus. The cause of trade friction was not simply the fact ofJapan's
extreme trade structure, with its huge surpluses in manufacturedgoods.
It was the fact that this trade structure was stillemerging, through a
surge in Japanese exports, that made for rising tension.13
But 1.4 this emphasis n the rate of change is right, it has very
upbeat irnplcations. It implies that much of the trade friction of the
past decade has been the result, not of enduring features of US—Japanese
trade, but of the process of adjustment to a changed world economic
environment. Even if that environment were to remain stable, we could
expect some reduction of tension as the adjustment was completed. In
fact, the news is better still: since early 1985 we have seen a
substantial reversal of both the rise in oil prices and the overvaluation
of the dollar. Is the stage now set for a real easing of tensions?
PROSPECTS FOR US—JAPANESE TRADE FRICTION -
Inthe last few months both the value of the dollar and the price of
oil have fallen sharply. The dollar—yen rate has fallen to record lows;
the real price of oil, incredibly, is at least temporarily down to 1973
levels. It is still too soon to know where these prices will eventually
settle. If any large part of the change proves durable, however, we are
now getting exactly the reverse of the shocks that accounted for rising
trade friction in the 70s and BOs.
There is no uncertainty about the qualitative direction of effect of
a declining dollar and a declining oil price. The decline of the dollar
may be viewed as a new unwillingness by international investors to
provide the US with a large surplus on capital account. s the (iS capital
account surplus declines, so must its current account deficit. At least14
part of that decline will show up as reduced Japanese trade surpluses and
export volume. At the same time, the decline in the price of oil will
produce a decline in Japans primary commodity deficit, which will
eventually be offset by a corresponding decline in her manufacturing
surplus.
What we need to know, however, is how important this relief will be
in quantitative terms. Are the recent declines in oil and the dollar
enough to make a crucial difference? To answer this we need at least a
rough model. What I will do is build on the accounting framework
developed above to make a first—pass answer to the question of
magnitudes. The results suggest that the reduction in trade friction
should be major indeed.
A Simple Model
To make as compact as possible a model of the future of Japanese
trade, I will make two simplifying assumptions. First is that Japan's
terms of trade will be taken as exogenous ——thatis, any effects arising
from exchange rate changes will be ruled out. Since the yen may be
expócted to be stronger in the future than it was in the past, this
assumption actually weakens my case.
Second, I will treat the Japanese balance of trade as exogenous,
simply assuming plausible values rather than explicitly deriving it
Jointly with the exchange rate. In fact, I will substitute out the
exchange rate and deal directly with reduced form expressions for trade15
flows as functions of the terms of trade and the trade balance. Themain
justification for this procedure is that it makes lifeeasy. It may also
be argued, however, that we know more about the determinants oflong—run
current accounts than we do about the process of exchange rate adjustment
that gets us there.
Let us begin, then, with an equation for the growth of exports. I
will assume that the growth rate depends on the rate of change ofsome
measure of the real exchange rate and on a trend term reflecting the
growth of the economy as a whole:
(4) qx = exr +y
where ex is the elasticity of exports with respect to the exchangerate,
r is the rate of real depreciation, and y is the tread component.
We have a similar equation on the import side, where I assume that
the trend component is the same: i.e., at a constant realexchange rate
imports and exports would grow at the same rate.
(5) qM = —eMr +y
We can now use (3), (4), and (5) to solve for the growth rates of both
imports and exports as functions of terms of trade and the trade balance.





This gives us our equations for volume growth:
(6) qx= y+SXCPM
—+ b]
(7) qPl =y+SMEPrI—+ b]
where Sxex/(ex+eM)and SM= eM/(ex + eM).
What equations (6) and (7) say, in words, is that there is assumed
to be an underlying rate of trade growth common to exports and imports.
Shifts in either the terms of trade or the trade balance relative to
exports will cause a divergence between export and import growth rates;
this divergence will always be divided between higher export growth and
lower import growth in the same proportions.
Our next step is to quantify these volume equations. We begin by
choosing a plausible value for y. Over the period from 1973—1984 the
Japanese economy grew in real terms at an annual rate of 3.7 percent. It
seems reasonable to suppose that other things equal Japans trade would
have grown a little faster than GNP. I will assume a growth rate y of 4.0
percent annually.17
Thisnow allows us to go directly to Sxand s.From 1973 to 19B4
export volume grew at 8.5 percent per year, an excess of 4.5 percentage
points over our assumed y. Import volume grew at 1.6 percent, 2.4
percentage points less than y. The divergence in export and import growth
was 6.B percent. So in the past, we have Sx= 4.5/6.8=0.65,and
similarly 5M= 2.4/6.8=0.35.Given any shock to Japan's external
situation, whether from the terms of trade or the capital account, we can
expect 65 percent to be reflected in export volume and 35 percent in
import volume.
What we have now done is to create a small envelope whose back is
well—suited to quick calculations. We now ask what this model tells us
about the implications of recent international events for Japan's trade.
Recent Shocks and Japan's Export Growth
In assessing the prospects for Japan's trade, we need estimates of
how much correction is currently taking place. Two questions arise: how
much will the decline in the overvalued dollar reduce Japan's current
account surplus, and how much will oil prices fall?
Earlier I suggested as a plausible guess that an elimination of the
US current deficit would be associated with a decline in Japan's surplus
of $15 billion from its 1984 level, or 1.25 percent of GNP. Since Japan's
current surplus in 1984 was 2.8 percent, this implies a remaining
structural surplus of 1.55 percent of GNP ——nota small number. I will
make a 1.25 percent decline in Japan's current surplus the central case.I8
For comparison, however, the case of0.5percertdecline nd a 2
percent decline will also be considered.
Oil prices are still in considerable flux. At the time of writing
they were dropping into single—digit numbers. There seems to be no
alternative except to consider a wide range of possibilities. Using 1984
as a baseline, I will consider the cases of 20, 40, and 60 percent
decline, with 40 percent the central case.
To examine the consequences of these alternative scenarios, we first
convert these assumptions into trade balance changes as a fraction of
exports. In 1984 the average of Japan's exports and imports was $146
billion, so a trade balance reduction of $15 billion would have
corresponded to 10.3 percent. Also, in 1984 fuels accounted for 45
percent of Japan's imports, so a 40 percent decline in energy prices
would correspond to a terms of trade improvement of 18 percent. Thus in
the central case the shock term [pM —+ b)in the export growth
equation is set equal to —28.3. The same calculation is made for each
combination of oil price fall and current account adjustment.
Now the adjustment will not come all at once, and in any case we are
not interested only in the very near term. Furthermore, the framework is
lacking in realistic dynamics. We can, however, use the approach to ask
what the averjg rate of export growth over some specified future period
is. I arbitrarily take a five—year time horizon, treating the shock as if
it were spread evenly over that period.19
Tables 2 and 3 show the results of the assumed shocks for Japanese
export and import growth over the next five years. Since most of the
response is supposed to come on the export side, it is the export table
that is more striking. If Japan's current account surplus falls to 1.55
percent of SNP ——wellabove its average during the 1970s ——andoil
prices remain 40 percent below their 1984 level, we can expect to see
virtually zero growth in Japanese export volume over the next five years.
Clearly such a cessation of Japanese export growth would bring about
a dramatic reduction of trade frictions. In fact, it will probably seem
to most readers to be too good to be true. It is important to recognize,
therefore, that there is nothing outlandish about this calculation. We
have simply applied to the future of Japan's trade the logic that many
observers have applied to its past. Oil price increases and a move toward
current account surplus led to a pace of Japanese export expansion during
1973—84 greatly in excess of GNP growth. Even a stabilization of oil
prices and the current account would have implied a considerable
subsequent slowdown. The fact that oil prices have once again fallen, and
the likelihood of at least some reduction in Japan's surplus, mean that
for the medium term future Japan's exports must grow considerably more
slowly than her GNP.
HOW HI6H THE YEN?20
The mechanism of adjustment implicit in our reduced—form equations
(6) and (7) involves exchange rate appreciation. I have tried, however,
to avoid making the predictions about trade volumes contingent on an
exchange rate forecast. Instead the problem has been stated in terms of
the link between fundamentals, the price of oil and the structural
current surplus, and the trade outcome. The reason for stating the
problem this way is to place the emphasis on the trade adjustment that
must eventually happen, rather than on the unpredictable details of the
exchange rate path that gets us there.
Nonetheless, it is clear that the trade adjustment described here
implies a very strong yen compared with that of 1984. It is an
irresistible temptation to speculate about the level of the yen necessary
to effect the shift in trade structure implied by Tables 2 and 3.
The nominal value of the yen has of course been touching record
levels in recent weeks. This apparent strength needs, however, to be
discounted for at least three, and possibly four reasons. First, there is
the obvious point of differential inflation rates, with Japan having
substantially lower inflation since 1980 than the US. Second, there is
the Kravis/Balassa effect: rapid Japanese productivity growth is
disproportionately concentrated in tradeables, imparting a substantial
bias to real exchange rate measures based on aggregate prices. Third,
there is the shift in the real exchange rate implied by the fall in oil
prices, perhaps offset by a shift of Japan into structural current
account surplus. Finally, and most speculatively, there is the question
of "hysteresis' in the trade pattern, in which reversing the dollars
rise need not reverse all of its effects.21
c t i vy
The inflation and productivity issues can best be treated together.
Suppose that, in standard fashion, we try to guess at the equilibrium
value of a currency by calculating a purchasing power par on some
historical baseline. Our usual problem is finding a baseline; in the
Japanese case, this problem is however dwarfed by the problem of
divergence in price indices. Richard Marston (1986) has recently
emphasized the point that rapid Japanese productivity growth is
concentrated primarily in its manufacturing sector. This unbalanced
productivity growth means that a Japanese/US purchasing power parity
calculated for prices of manufactured goods falls steadily relative to
one calculated using more aggregate indexes, such as CPIs. Figure 4 shows
the extent of this divergence. Using an arbitrary 1973 base, it compares
the ratio of the Japanese DPI to its US counterpart, on one side, to the
ratio of the Japanese manufacturing value—added deflator to its US
counterpart, on the other. Incredibly, the divergence between the
manufacturing price relative and the DPI price relative grew at an
average annual rate of 4.4 percent over the 1973—1983 period.
To make a guess at the equilibrium yen, we need first to decide
which of these price indexes to use. It seems clear that manufactures is
the right choice, since what we want is the 'battlefield" sector in which
the US and Japan compete. Also, we need to choose a baseline. Somewhat
arbitrarily, I will take the geometric average manufacturing real22
exchange rate over the period 1973—79 as the base. Finally, to bring the
estimateup to date I assume that the ifanuf actur i rig PPP has continued to
fall relative to the ratio of CF'Is at the same rate as during the 1973—83
period,i.e., 4.4 percentper year, and extrapolate using actual consumer
priceinflation. The result is shown in Figure 5: a seemingly innocuous
procedure leads us to a purchasing power parity yen of less than 140.
Oil prices and the current account
Ideally, we would like to correct the PPP estimate by an adjustment
for the two offsetting factors of a rise in Japan's structural current
account surplus and the decline in oil prices. During the 1970s Japan ran
only small surpluses in her current account; with the liberalization of
capital markets it now seems likely that Japan will run persistent
current account surpluses. This factor will tend to weaken the yen. On
the other hand, the decline in oil prices reduces the manu4acturing
surplus associated with any given current account, and thus implies a
stronger yen. It is useful to think of these effects as percentages of
trade: each ten percent fall in the price of oil reduces the needed non—
oil surplus by 4.5 percent of the average of imports and exports, while
each percentage point of GNP added to the current account surplus adds
8.4 percent. If our baseline case of a 40 percent fall in oil prices and
a 1.55 percent structural surplus were right, the net effect would be to
strengthen the equilibrium yen.23
yste r eSS
Thereis a widespread belief among businessmen, shared by some
economists, that the markets lost by the US from a sustained strong
dollar cannot be recaptured simply by restoring the dollar to its former
level. A model in which temporary overvaluation cart cause permanent loss
of market share may be referred to as one characterized by hysteresis'.
A totally hysterical view ofthetrade balance would say that the
exchange rate determines not the level of that balance but instead its
rate of change. Hysteresis in the trade pattern can be justified
theoretically by invoking the role of economies of scale, especially
dynamic econooties such as the learning curve.
There is no hard evidence at this point on the importance of
hysteresis in practice. My own view is that there is substantial
circumstantial evidence for hysteresis in the observed fact that
countries, such as Japan, that have had to expand their exports rapidly
over time, have not had to have persistently declining relative export
prices. Estimated trade flow equations reflect this either by finding
that fast growing countries, by coincidence, have low income elasticities
of import demand and face high elasticities of exportdemand, or by
including domestic capacity in the export equation. A possible
alternative explanation is that fast—growing countries are able tobuy
steadily rising market shares simply by having a low, rather than a
declining, relative price.24
If there is in fact substantial hysteresis in international trade,
the implication is not that the US can never win its markets back.
Instead, it is that for the US to win back its markets the dollar must go
through a period of undervaluation comparable to its previous
overvaluation. While I am not in a position to quantify this effect, it
seems to point to an even higher yen than the previous numbers would
suggest.
Financial markets and short—run exchge rate determination
This paper has made a point of staying clear of the attempt to model
the short run determination of the exchange rate in financial markets. It
could, for instance, be the case that even though the yen must eventually
rise above 140 it is temporarily being kept low by the differential in
real interest rates between the US and Japan. Long—term government bonds
are continuing to pay about 3.3 percentage points more in the US than in
Japan, a difference that exceeds conventional measures of the expected
inflation differential.
We have Just seen, however, that the biased nature of productivity
growth in Japan implies that there should be a secular appreciation of
the real exchange rate of the yen against the dollar, at least when that
rate is measured using aggregate price indexes. For relative purchasing
power parity in manufactures to have been maintained in the 1973—83
period the real yen as calculated using CPIs would have had to appreciate
at 4.4 percent annually. This suggests that the apparently higher real25
interestrate in the US results from the choice of an inappropriate
measure of inflation. If we use manufacturing value added deflators, we
would almost surely find that the real interest rate is higher inJapan.
So there is no good reason for the realyen not to rise to the levels
that Japanese trade adjustment must eventually require.Apparently
financial markets either do not agree or do not understand this.
Ourdiscussion ofthe value of the yen rests on shakier ground than
theearlierdiscussion of Japanese trade adjustment. Certainly after the
last five years nobody can have much confidence inany exchange rate
forecast. What the numbers appear to say, however, is that the adjustment
of Japan's trade to a reduced current account surplus and lower oil
prices should be accompanied by an extremely strong yen. Somewhat
startlingly, I have no difficulty in convincing myself that a yen above
140 is entirely reasonable.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper has offered something that is unusual in discussions of
US—Japanese trade relations: an optimistic outlook. The calculations on
which this optimism is based will probably seem startling. Letus then
finish the discussion by reviewing the argument, to seewhythe numbers
suggested are not at all outlandish.26
The key political assumption here is thatUS—Japanese trade tension
in fact owes little to Japanese trade and business practices. The source
of trade friction lies instead in the structure of Japanese trade, in the
huge Japanese surplus in manufactures and especially in the rapid pace of
growth of Japan's exports. The surplus in manufactures is primarily the
counterpart of a huge deficit in raw materials, and part of the rest can
be attributed to the overvalued dollar. The rapid growth in Japans
exports was not an inevitable counterpart of her much slower economic
growth. Instead, it was driven mostly by the deterioration of Japan's
terms of trade as oil prices rose, and partly by a shift of Japan into
current account surplus ——ofwhich, again, part can be attributed to the
overvalued dollar.
Some relief from the frictions caused by rapidly growing Japanese
exports would have come even if oil prices and the US current account
deficit had merely stabilized: Japan's export growth would have dropped
downtosomething like her GNP growth once the adjustment was over,
However, we have suddenly been given a much stronqer dose of medicine,
with oil prices plunging and the dollar dropping to levels that should
reduce the current account deficit sharply. If we accept the story about
what happened in the 1973—84 period, we must also accept that the story
will now run in reverse: for some time to come3 Japan's exports willgrow
much more slowly than her GNP. The precise numbers given in this paper
are only speculative and illustrative3 but they convey a message that is
not too sensitive to the details.27
Theinevitablecounterpart of this niessaqe is that we are enterinq
an era of an extremely strong yen. The guess at the equilibriumyen is
even more speculative than the analysis of export growth, but again the
point seems clear: the sharp appreciation of the yen since lastyear has
not overshot, and there is probably still a considerableway to go.
We should conclude by noting that this discussion has ina political
sense concentrated almost entirely on the political pressures on Japan's
trading partners, rather than on politics in Japan itself. While the
developments predicted here will reduce trade pressures in the US and
elsewhere, they will of course create major tension in Japan. There will
clearly be strong internal pressures on Japan's government to block the
trade adjustment predicted here. The essential point thatJapan should
realize is that a sharp reduction in export growth is in the end
inevitable, whatever the country's trade and exchange rate policy.References
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